DigitalCommons@NYLS
Articles & Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

11-28-2016

Can a Bankruptcy Court Approve a Settlement That Violates
Absolute Priority: Czyzewski et al. v. Jevic Holding Corp. et al.
Marshall E. Tracht

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters

BANKRUPTCY
Can a Bankruptcy Court Approve a Settlement That Violates Absolute Priority?
CASE AT A GLANCE
A corporate chapter 11 case can result in a confirmed plan of reorganization, a conversion to a chapter 7
liquidation, or dismissal of the case. The Bankruptcy Code provides specific priorities for the payment of
claims in the first two cases, while in the third, dismissal, the parties are typically returned to their prebankruptcy entitlements. The question in this case is whether a bankruptcy court can approve a litigation
settlement between the debtor and some creditors in which the debtor’s assets are distributed in a
manner that violates the statutory priorities that would apply under a confirmed chapter 11 plan or chapter
7 liquidation.

Czyzewski et al. v. Jevic Holding Corp. et al.
Docket No. 15-649
Argument Date: December 7, 2016
From: The Third Circuit
by Marshall Tracht
New York Law School, New York, NY

INTRODUCTION
Throughout its history, corporate bankruptcy law has confronted the
problem of junior parties, such as shareholders, negotiating deals
with senior parties in which they cut out intervening creditors. The
Bankruptcy Code deals with this by the rule of “absolute priority,”
which requires that the debtor’s assets be distributed in a deined
order and provides that no junior party can receive value unless all
senior classes of claims are being paid in full (although a senior
class can vote to accept lesser treatment). First, secured creditors
are entitled the value of their collateral, up to the full amount of
their claims. The Code then provides for the payment of various
classes of priority claims, such as the costs of administering the
case, tax claims, and employee wage and beneit claims. Any
remaining value is distributed pro rata to the holders of general
unsecured claims (with the excess, in the rare case of a solvent
debtor, to shareholders). These priorities must be followed in any
chapter 11 plan or chapter 7 liquidation.
Jevic presents a common pattern in today’s bankruptcy cases: the
senior parties held liens on essentially all of the debtor’s assets, so
no value would be available to anyone else in a chapter 7 liquidation,
nor could a chapter 11 plan be conirmed without their consent.
Here, the senior parties entered into a deal with the debtor that
settled litigation against them, permitting some assets to be used
to pay administrative expenses and general unsecured creditors
while skipping over certain employee claims entitled to priority over
those general unsecured creditors. The bankruptcy court approved
the settlement and dismissal of the case, and was afirmed by the
district court. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals afirmed primarily
on the ground that it was a “rare situation” and that absent this
deal, no one but the secured creditor would get anything. The
employee claimants, as petitioners, argue that the bankruptcy court
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could not approve the settlement because it violates absolute priority
and approval is therefore inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.

ISSUE
Does a bankruptcy court have the authority to approve a settlement,
or “structured dismissal” of the bankruptcy case, under which
a debtor’s assets are distributed in a manner that would violate
the priority provisions that apply under a conirmed plan of
reorganization or liquidation in chapter 7?

FACTS
The debtor, Jevic Transportation, is a trucking company that was
acquired by a private equity irm, Sun Capital Partners, Inc., in a
2006 leveraged buyout. The buyout was soon reinanced through an
$85 million loan from a consortium led by CIT Group, secured by all
of Jevic’s assets. Jevic soon defaulted, and in 2007 CIT obtained a
$2 million guaranty from Sun as part of a forbearance agreement.
Sun later paid on this guaranty, obtaining a $2 million lien on the
debtors’ assets. In May of 2008, Jevic ceased operations, terminating
its employees and iling for chapter 11 bankruptcy. Petitioners are
a certiied class of approximately 1,800 employees who sued Jevic
and Sun under the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notiication (WARN) Act and a similar New Jersey statute.
As is common in failed leveraged buyouts, the debtors and its
creditors had potential fraudulent transfer claims against Sun, and
the oficial committee of unsecured creditors was authorized to
bring suit on Jevic’s behalf. If the committee prevailed, CIT’s and
Sun’s liens on Jevic’s assets could potentially be avoided, and those
assets would be available to pay all creditors, including petitioners,
rather than just the secured claims of CIT and Sun. In 2011, the
bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss the fraudulent transfer
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claims. In 2012, the debtor, Sun, and CIT iled a motion asking the
court to approve a settlement of the litigation under which claims
would be released, certain payments made, and the bankruptcy
case dismissed. Speciically, the estate would release all claims
against Sun and CIT. In exchange, CIT would pay $2 million to
be used to satisfy various administrative claims, including the
committee’s attorney fees, and Sun assigned its (contested) lien
on $1.7 million of the debtors’ cash to pay other priority claims
and a percentage of general unsecured claims. No payments would
be made to petitioners on their priority wage claims, however,
apparently because Sun refused to accept a settlement that would
pay petitioners unless they released their suit against Sun alleging
liability for Jevic’s violation of the WARN Act. By paying general
unsecured claims without paying petitioners’ priority wage claims,
the settlement provided for a distribution at odds with the absolute
priority rule.
Petitioners and the United States Trustee objected to the proposed
settlement and dismissal based on the violation of the Code’s
priority provisions, but the bankruptcy court approved the deal. It
acknowledged the violation of absolute priority, but held that the
priority rules did not apply because the distributions were not being
made under a plan of reorganization, nor was the settlement a
means of avoiding the requirements that apply to a plan because
there was no reasonable prospect that a plan could be conirmed.
(One requirement of plan conirmation is that administrative
claims be paid in full, and as there were no unpledged assets,
administrative claims could not be paid unless Sun or CIT permitted
payment from their collateral.)
The alternatives to approving the settlement and structured
dismissal would have been conversion to chapter 7 liquidation
or dismissal of the case without approving the settlement. Sun
asserted that it would not agree to this settlement in a chapter 7
and that a chapter 7 trustee would have no money to inance the
fraudulent transfer litigation. The court credited this assertion,
also inding that the fraudulent transfer litigation could not be
pursued on a contingency basis because it was subject to a variety of
defenses, and any lawyer who took the case “should have his head
examined.” In a chapter 7, therefore, neither petitioners nor any
other unsecured creditors would receive anything from the estate.
A dismissal would normally result in restoration of the status quo
ante, as if the bankruptcy case had not taken place. That would allow
petitioners to ile a state law fraudulent transfer case against Sun
and CIT if they chose. However, the structured dismissal approved a
settlement of the fraudulent actions claim by the estate, essentially
on behalf of all creditors, precluding such a suit.
The district court and a divided panel of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals afirmed. The panel’s majority noted that they were
“troubled” by the violation of absolute priority and that the Code
did not provide expressly for structured dismissals. They reasoned,
however, that while “the Code contemplates that dismissal will
typically reinstate the pre-petition state of affairs by revesting
property in the debtor and vacating orders and judgments of the
bankruptcy court, it also explicitly authorizes the bankruptcy court
to alter the effect of dismissal ‘for cause’.” It noted that there was
“no prospect of a conirmable plan in this case and that conversion
to Chapter 7 was a bridge to nowhere,” so while structured
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dismissals might be problematic, “[f]or present purposes, it sufices
to say that absent a showing that a structured dismissal has been
contrived to evade the procedural protections and safeguards of the
plan conirmation or conversion processes, a bankruptcy court has
discretion to order such a disposition.”
The panel noted that there was a circuit conlict on whether the
absolute priority rule had to be followed in a litigation settlement
approved by the bankruptcy court. In Matter of AWECO, Inc.,
725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984), the court rejected a settlement of a
lawsuit against a chapter 11 debtor, which would have transferred
$5.3 million in estate assets to an unsecured creditor despite the
existence of outstanding senior claims, because the settlement
would have violated the absolute priority rule. The Second Circuit
disagreed in In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir.
2007), calling the AWECO holding “too rigid.” It held that while
compliance with the absolute priority rule “must be the most
important factor for the bankruptcy court to consider when
determining whether a settlement is ‘fair and equitable’ under Rule
9019,” a noncompliant settlement could be approved when “the
remaining factors weigh heavily in favor of approving a settlement.”
The Third Circuit adopted the Iridium standard, citing the need for
“lexibility.” Reiterating that compliance with the absolute priority
rule “will normally be dispositive of whether a proposed settlement
is fair and equitable,” it held that bankruptcy courts may approve
settlements that violate absolute priority in “rare cases” where they
have “speciic and credible grounds to justify [the] deviation.”

CASE ANALYSIS
Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a plan of
reorganization may only be conirmed if it is “fair and equitable,”
a term of art meaning that the absolute priority rule is satisied.
No creditor may receive or retain value under a plan if a senior
class of claims has not been provided full payment (unless that
senior class voted to accept lesser treatment). The absolute priority
rule must also be followed in distribution of a debtors’ estate in a
chapter 7 case.
Petitioners argue that there are only three ways out of chapter 11,
the irst two being plan conirmation and conversion to chapter 7,
each of which requires compliance with absolute priority. The third
is dismissal, which normally reinstates the status quo ante, as if
the bankruptcy case had not been iled. Thus, petitioners argue,
the structure of the Bankruptcy Code shows that Congress did not
intend for bankruptcy courts to enter orders, such as the settlement
and structured dismissal in this case, that violate absolute priority.
The rule exists to prevent collusive settlements in which senior
and junior parties work together to cut out intervening creditors.
Settlements that provide for the distribution of assets in violation
of absolute priority, petitioners argue, are an impermissible “end
run” around the requirements of the Code that would endanger the
negotiation process even in cases where the issue never comes to
the court, because the threat of such a deal would force parties such
as petitioners to settle on disadvantageous terms.
Petitioners argue that it is not viable to permit settlements or
structured dismissals that violate absolute priority only in “rare
cases” where there are “speciic and credible grounds,” because
these deals can always be presented as the only alternative to failure
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of the case. Claims that no other settlement is possible, as in Sun’s
claim that it would not settle if the case were converted to chapter 7,
are not veriiable, and experience shows that exceptions originally
limited to exceptional circumstances often become the norm. For
example, releases of nondebtor parties were originally permitted
only in exceptional circumstances but have now become a routine
part of chapter 11 plans for large companies.
Respondents argue irst that petitioners played a game of “bait
and switch,” petitioning for certiorari on the question of whether
bankruptcy courts are precluded from approving settlements that
violate absolute priority, but then asking the Court to rule on the
validity of structured settlements. Respondents say this is because
petitioners have realized they cannot win on the question they
originally raised. The validity of structured dismissals, respondents
argue, has not yet percolated through the courts of appeal and is not
ripe for review, and the Court should, if it rules at all, limit itself to
the settlement issue.
Respondents argue that the Court should not rule on the case,
however, because there is no “case or controversy,” and thus no
jurisdiction. A “case or controversy” under Article III only exists
where a party has suffered an injury that is likely to be redressed
by a favorable ruling. A ruling in favor of petitioners would result
in a remand of the case, where there would be no recovery for
petitioners or anyone else other than the secured creditors.
Respondents argue that petitioners are seeking an “advisory
opinion” to establish a rule that would apply in other cases, not
redress for an injury in this one.
On the merits, respondents argue that the absolute priority rule
does not apply when a bankruptcy court approves a settlement,
only to plan conirmation. They contend that there is no statutory
requirement that a litigation settlement by the debtor be approved
by the court at all. Courts have generally found authority to approve
settlements in § 363 of the Code, which provides for approval of
the use, sale, or lease of property outside the ordinary course of
business. (Decisions that are within the ordinary course of business
do not require any court approval.) Most courts have deemed the
settlement of litigation as being, in essence, a sale of the cause of
action. Respondents argue, however, that a settlement of a claim
is not a “sale,” because a sale involves a transfer and there is
no transfer of a cause of action when it is settled. Moreover, the
provision of the prior Bankruptcy Act which required the court to
approve settlements was not included in the Bankruptcy Code. This
was intentional, respondents argue, as part of the decision to reduce
the role of the bankruptcy court in the day-to-day administration
of the bankruptcy estate. As there is no need for approval, they
argue, it is nonsensical to say that the approval power is subject to a
limitation based on the absolute priority rule. The Code has speciic
provisions that apply the absolute priority rule to plan conirmation
and distributions in chapter 7 and, respondents argue, extending
that rule to settlements would effectively rewrite the statute in
a manner Congress did not intend. Moreover, this would deprive
bankruptcy courts of the lexibility to deal with the multiplicity of
situations they confront in complex cases.
Respondents also disagree with petitioners’ claim that it is
unworkable to allow approval of such settlements while limiting
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that power to exceptional circumstances or rare cases. They argue
that the Third Circuit enunciated two speciic limitations that would
contain the rule. Courts would not be able to approve settlements
that violate absolute priority (1) when they are used to circumvent
the plan conirmation process or conversion to chapter 7, or (2) if
they increase the share of the estate distributed to one group of
creditors at the expense of other creditors. Those requirements
were satisied here based on the bankruptcy court’s express indings
that there was no reasonable prospect for a plan, and that none
of the unsecured creditors, including petitioners, would receive
anything if the case had been converted to Chapter 7.

SIGNIFICANCE
This case could have a substantial effect on commercial bankruptcy
practice. Litigation settlements are a large part of bankruptcy
proceedings, and any change in the rules governing them would
have wide-ranging effects. Nor are the facts in this case particularly
uncommon. It is not unusual for a senior secured lender to hold
a lien on all of the debtor’s assets while being subject to possible
litigation. If the Court approves settlements that violate absolute
priority, it is an avenue likely to be explored in many cases, and will
typically enhance the considerable power senior secured creditors
have over the resolution of the case. It offers the potential beneit
of a release from liability while bypassing a variety of requirements
that come into play in the plan conirmation process, including the
drafting and approval of a disclosure statement, voting on a plan,
and a conirmation hearing that scrutinizes the plan along any
number of dimensions. Parties that commonly hold priority claims
are concerned about the effect, as evidenced by the amicus brief
iled by numerous states concerned that this will become a tool to
bypass tax claims.
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can be reached at mtracht@nyls.edu or 212.431.2139.
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Mr. Bursch: Right, but the utilitarian function of the fabric
only works—of the design only works in conjunction with the
useful article, and the same is true here. When you talk about
camouflage, it’s creating an optical illusion, right? We’ve got that
picture on page 1 of our reply brief, and when you first look at
that, you don’t immediately see that there is a person standing in
that tree because they are camouflaged. Well, in the same way
with these cheerleader-uniform designs, it creates the optical
illusion that they are taller, that they’re slimmer, that they’re
curvier. You know, all these functions work exactly the same way
as camouflage.
Justice Stephen Breyer: Forget the special things. I have a picture
of a dress now. The dress is in my mind. I have abstracted it.
When I look at those forms in space, it looks like a dress.
Mr. Bursch: Yes.
Justice Breyer: All right. Now, you’d say, I take it, that when
I’ve tried to identify the design separately, I’ve ended up with
something that is not capable of existing independently of the

“utilitarian aspects” of the dress, because it looks like a dress. So
when Marcel Duchamp has a shovel on the wall and says it’s a
work of art, he can have a copyright as long as he doesn’t try to
sue people who make shovels.
Mr. Bursch: Exactly.
Justice Breyer: That’s it.
Mr. Bursch: That is the “identified separately” portion of our
argument.
Justice Breyer: That’s your point. That’s your point.
Mr. Bursch: That’s one of two points.
Justice Breyer: And then if you fail on that, you have all the
specialized arguments about special purposes of cheerleader
costumes.
Mr. Bursch: Right.
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